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Abstract Given free information and unlimited processing power, should decision
algorithms use as much information as possible? A formal model of the decision-
making environment is developed to address this question and provide conditions
under which informationally frugal algorithms, without any information or pro-
cessing costs whatsoever, are optimal. One cause of compression that allows opti-
mal algorithms to rationally ignore information is inverse movement of payoffs and
probabilities (e.g., high payoffs occur with low probably and low payoffs occur with
high probability). If inversely related payoffs and probabilities cancel out, then
predictors that correlate with payoffs and consequently condition the probabilities
associated with different payoffs will drop out of the expected-payoff objective
function, severing the link between information and optimal action rules. Stochastic
payoff processes in which rational ignoring occurs are referred to as compressed
environments, because optimal action depends on a reduced-dimension subset of the
environmental parameters. This paper considers benefits and limitations of eco-
nomic models versus other methods for studying links between environmental
structure and the real-world success of simple decision procedures. Different
methods converge on the normative proposition of ecological rationality, as opposed
to axiomatic rationality based on informational efficiency and internal consistency
axioms, as a superior framework for comparing the effectiveness of decision
strategies and prescribing decision algorithms in application.
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Introduction
This paper offers a formal decision-theoretic result showing a less-is-more effect
regarding the information requirements of expected-payoff-maximizing decision
algorithms. In ongoing debates over normative criteria for what it means to make
good, or rational, decisions, economists and formal decision theorists tend to put
forward axiomatic criteria, such as transitive preferences or the Savage Axioms that
underlie expected-utility theory, as appropriate normative benchmarks (Raiffa
1986). Axiomatic notions of rationality require self consistency above all else,
rather than absolute levels of performance, and their requirements of self
consistency apply, by definition, across all decision domains. In contrast, ecological
rationality focuses on the match between a decision algorithm and the environment
in which it is applied: if the match is good enough that the decision maker avoids
harm, then the algorithm is likely to persist. Because of the high dimensionality of
the decision maker’s action space, constant change in the stochastic payoff
environment, and profound limitations on any mind or machine’s ability to list
future outcomes let alone assign probabilities to those outcomes, proponents of
ecological rationality argue that there is little adaptive pressure in most natural
environments to optimize (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
Optimization may be well-defined but infeasible, as in the game of chess. Or
optimization may be ill-defined, as in mate choice—who, after all, could list the
criteria for optimal selection of his or her spouse and evaluate potential spouses by
these criteria? Whether infeasible or ill-defined, axiomatic rationality is inapplica-
ble, and ecological criteria requiring only that decision processes work well enough
to survive would seem to provide more practical normative content.
One major disagreement in debates about axiomatic versus ecological rationality,
with clear ramifications in applied problems of designing machines to monitor signals
and return judgments, classifications or decisions, concerns the quantity of informa-
tion. Is more always better? Game theorists acknowledge that, in some strategic
settings, possessing information can be disadvantageous (say, when one is a witness to
a crime and consequently becomes targeted because of possession of unwanted
information). They claim, however, that more information is necessarily better in
games against nature (Raiffa and Shlaifer 1961). There is also a sizeable literature in
psychology showing that human subjects often ignore relevant information, with the
interpretation that ignoring is pathological (Kahneman et al. 1982).
This paper provides a formal model in which it is possible to state precise
conditions under which expected-payoff-maximization is consistent with ignoring
relevant information. If expected-payoff maximization is consistent with ignoring
relevant, or predictive, information, then there can be no competitive pressure
selecting for decision rules that take more information into account.
As background, consider the finding that sleep deprivation, even at moderate
levels, increases the risk of an auto accident by an amount similar to that of alcohol
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intoxication (Mahowald 2000). Time of day also correlates strongly with
occurrences of auto accidents (Clarke et al. 2002; Dobie 2002; Pack et al. 1995).
And geographic location is another factor known to condition chances of a traffic
accident (Mohan 2001). Does it follow, then, that rational decisions about whether
to use seat belts should necessarily depend on these variables because they predict
outcomes that affect drivers’ payoffs?
This question is also relevant for machine learning and for the development of
algorithms used by machines: Would the expected-payoff-maximizing decision
algorithm used by a machine programmed to decide on seat belting necessarily
depend on location, time of day, and the previous night’s sleep? Or might optimal
decision rules rationally ignore some of that information? This paper shows that the
answer to the last question is affirmative. Expected-payoff-maximizing decision
algorithms rationally ignore signals that are correlated with payoffs if the stochastic
payoff environment satisfies several properties.
According to the cost-benefit model implicit in the objective of maximizing
expected payoffs, optimal seat belt decisions should use information about risk
factors for traffic accidents that vary through time and space, as well as the
condition of the driver, together with a driver’s risk attitudes, subjective costs of seat
belting, expected fines for driving without a seat belt, and the intensity of
enforcement policies regarding seat belt rules. Of course, any particular decision,
either for or against seat belting, can be rationalized within the expected-payoff
maximization framework. Given sufficiently extreme dislike of seat belts or low
enough risk parameters, the decision to forgo the proven safety benefits of seat belts
is consistent with maximization. More generally, drivers driving at variable times,
locations, and with varying amounts of rest will maximize expected payoffs by
opting for seat belts in a contingent manner, based on a seat-belt-decision algorithm
that scores environments according to a weighted index of risk factors. Many drivers
in the real world do not do this, however.
Many drivers in the real world instead wear their seat belts automatically,
regardless of time, place or their own physiological condition. Is such behavior
irrational? No. Habitual or automatic decision processes that disregard observable
signals, which help predict the chances of an accident, are perfectly consistent with
expected-payoff maximization, so long as drivers regard the net benefits of seat
belting as positive in all environments, including those with the lowest possible risk.
In other words, if the decision maker has cost-benefit and risk parameters for which
it is optimal to wear the seat belt in every driving environment, then the expected-
payoff-maximizing decision algorithm will ignore signals that are correlated with
payoffs, contrary to the standard normative message in most of economics and
decision theory suggesting that more information is better, and that ignoring
relevant information is pathological.
Rather than an isolated case, optimizing seat belt strategies that ignore
statistically valid predictors of accidents are one manifestation of a general
principle. Bullock and Todd (1999) identified forms of asymmetry in the external
environment favoring information-frugal decision making. Forster (1999) suggested
systematic relationships between the structure of the environment and success of
simple decision rules. The robustness of simple algorithms with low informational
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requirements was demonstrated in a variety of contexts (Simon 1982; Bookstaber
and Langsam 1985; Brooks 1991; Martignon and Schmitt 1999; Todd 1999;
Martignon et al. 2008; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009). Goldstein and Gigerenzer
(2002) analyzed cue-criterion correlations that underlie a special class of less-is-
more effects. Hogarth (2001) and Hogarth and Karelaia (2005) specified conditions
on data generating processes that favor frugal rules of inference.
In spite of these developments, our understanding of the links between
environmental structure and the effectiveness of simple decision procedures
remains incomplete. This paper proposes an economic model to generalize the
question: What conditions on environments enable low-information decision rules
to match the performance of decisions based on full optimization? We approach this
question in steps. What is an environment? What does low-information mean? And
with respect to what metric is performance to be measured? After formalizing the
requisite concepts and introducing a rigorous definition of the decision-making
environment, the paper illustrates advantages of the formal modeling approach
using a particular example with special functional forms. An easy-to-interpret
analytic condition results, specifying precisely when payoffs and probabilities
interact to produce optimal action rules that are independent of objectively
predictive decision cues.
The General Decision Problem
Let Y be a continuous or discrete random variable representing states of the world
that are ex ante unobservable to the decision maker. The vector of cues X represents
observable environmental factors used to form expectations about Y. Assumption 1
rules out redundancy, or perfect collinearity, among cues:
A1 (non-redundancy) E[XX0] exists and is full rank.
The trivial case of cues that fail to predict states is also ruled out by requiring
each component of X to be state-relevant. To be state-relevant, there must be at least
one pair of values in the cue’s support at which the conditional expectation of Y is
non-constant with respect to X:
A2 (state-relevancy) E[Y|X] is non-constant in each component of X for some
value on its support.
The decision variable labeled a (for action) takes on values in the action space A:
The function fY|X(Y, X, a) denotes the conditional density of Y given X, which may
or may not depend on a. The payoff function p(Y, X, a) serves to rank conditional
distributions of Y according to the expected payoff criterion.
Mappings into Outcomes and Payoffs
Figure 1 illustrates three different mappings from observable information (X) and
actions (a) into outcomes (Y) and payoffs (p). Case 1 is the simplest, corresponding
to tasks frequently studied in experiments with human subjects such as paired
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comparison. In one well-known paired comparison task, two German cities are
drawn at random from a fixed list of cities, and subjects are asked to state which
among the two has a larger population (Gigerenzer et al. 1991). The state Y,
unknown to the mind or machine faced with the comparison task, codes whether the
larger city is listed first or second: Y = 1 or 2. Unconditional probabilities o the
events Y = 1 and Y = 2 are fixed at 1/2 by the experimental design. Obviously,
whether the decision maker picks the first or second city (a = 1 or a = 2) has no
effect on the frequency distribution of Y, indicated by the absence of an arrow
connecting a to Y in Fig. 1, Case 1. Choices of a together with Y do, nevertheless,
jointly determine payoffs p. The combinations (a, Y) = (1, 1) and (2, 2)
correspond to correctly picking the first or the second city, respectively, while
(1, 2) and (2, 1) represent incorrect paired comparisons.
What makes the comparison task interesting is the possibility of using
information in X by exploiting its components’ correlations with Y. In the city
example, X records city characteristics, correlated with Y to varying degrees, such as
presence of professional soccer teams, train stations and universities. Correlation
between X and Y reflected by arrows connecting those two symbols is a constant
feature of the model in all three cases in Fig. 1. Absence of an arrow between X and
p in Case 1 implies that payoffs depend only on actions and outcomes, not on other
observable covariates. Most paired comparison tasks studied in the psychology
literature satisfy this condition, in that correct answers are rewarded uniformly,
regardless of other contextual information contained in X. For example, payoffs are
the same for correctly answering which of two cities has the larger population,
regardless of whether both cities have train stations or not.
Cases 2 and 3 in Fig. 1 introduce additional complexity that requires further
examples to illustrate. Suppose now that states (Y), or outcomes, represent low and
high crop yields; a is choice of fertilizer types; p maps (Y, a) combinations into
payoffs as measured by the cash value of crop yields net of costs; and X codes
observable weather conditions at planting time. The arrow in Case 2 from a to Y
reflects the fact that choice of fertilizer affects the probabilities of high and low crop
yields. Unlike paired comparison tasks in which the actor’s decisions do not
influence experimentally determined probabilities of outcomes, the entire motiva-
tion for acting in many real-world environments is to improve the chances of a good
outcome.
In Case 3 of Fig. 1, an arrow links X and p, representing the most complicated
case. Extending the crop yield example of the previous paragraph, Case 3 would be
applicable if weather conditions coded in X also influenced thecash value of any
Fig. 1 Mappings from cues (X) and actions (a) into states(Y) and payoffs (p)
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realized level of crop yield Y. This would be the case if pre-planting weather
conditions simultaneously predicted low yields and higher than average market
prices at harvest time. In such a case, X conditions Y, as usual, but also moves p up
and down for any fixed value of Y.
Definition of Environment
Utilizing the framework introduced above, one can make a precise definition of the
decision-making environment. Suppose there exist states Y, cues X, and actions a.
We say that the pair of functions   ffY jXðY ; X; aÞ; pðY ; X; aÞg is an environment,
where fY|X is the conditional density of Y given X, and p is a scalar valued payoff
function representing fitness rankings, by the expected utility principle, over
conditional distributions of Y.
Ecological Versus Axiomatic Rationality
Formal specification of the environment usefully delimits the generalizability of
comparisons between two action functions, algorithms or decision procedures.
Consider two action functions a1(X) and a2(X), and two environments eA and eB. It
often happens that what works well in one setting is ineffective in another. Such
context-dependent evaluation of decision procedures can be translated as: a1ðXÞ A
a2ðXÞ and a2ðXÞ B a1ðXÞ . In other words, a1(X) performs better than a2(X) in
environment A, but the reverse is true in environment B.
From the perspective of ecological rationality, the performance of algorithms is
ei-specific (where i indexes a set of environments), based on rankings of expected
payoffs in environment ei. Action a(X) is adaptive, or ecologically rational with
respect to ei if it maximizes expected payoffs in ei for some set of action rules under
consideration.
A famous example is Simon’s (1982) notion of intelligent search. In environ-
ments with food uniformly distributed on a plane, intelligent search, supported by
capacities such as vision and memory, is equivalent to random search based on
nothing more than random movement in the plane. In environments where food is
distributed in clusters, intelligence, or rational foraging, means something quite
different, and memory can be exploited for adaptive gain. From the perspective of
ecological rationality, it is a mistake to regard memory as a beneficial cognitive
capacity in a universal sense. Rather, memory helps in some particular environ-
ments, but there are also environments where forgetting is advantageous, for
instance, when nonrandom forgetting improves the accuracy of inferences (Schooler
and Hertwig 2005), or when it enables forgiveness or peace of mind.
In much of the judgment and decision making literature, predictive accuracy is
tacitly assumed to measure performance, which would mean that p simply counts
the number of correct decisions, or is an increasing function of that count. Connolly
(1999) argues that predictive accuracy has special philosophical status in identifying
causal links. But important counter examples with highly asymmetric losses may
warrant reconsideration of predictive accuracy as a proper normative benchmark. In
Bullock and Todd’s (1999) mushroom selection task, a decision rule that maximizes
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predictive accuracy would aim to not eat mushrooms whenever they are poisonous,
and to eat mushrooms whenever they are non-poisonous. Compared to this
predictive-accuracy-maximizing strategy, more conservative strategies that waste
more non-poisonous mushrooms, but do better at avoiding poisonous mushrooms,
are easily superior in terms of promoting survival of the species. In the case of seat
belting, the predictive-accuracy-maximizing strategy would maximize the overall
chance of either wearing a seat belt when accidents occur, or of not wearing a seat
belt when no accident occurs. Again, because of asymmetric losses, departing from
predictive-accuracy maximization may be adaptive. Because smart behavior does
not necessarily maximize predictive accuracy, it is therefore important to be explicit
about p, any asymmetries of costs and benefits, and defend predictive accuracy on a
case-by-case basis.
In contrast, the axiomatic approach (e.g., Luce and Raiffa 1957) promotes the
position that there are appealing normative guidelines for ranking a1(X) and a2(X)
which hold universally across all environments, obviating the need to specify e.
Demonstrations of context specificity, such as Simon (1982), in which transitivity
and virtually all other imaginable constraints on decisions in the uniformly
distributed food environment fail to characterize effective search rules, would seem
to make the axiomatic approach less attractive. Following Simon’s lead, Todd
(2000), Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), Berg (2005) and Berg and Hoffrage (2008)
demonstrate high-stakes instances in which the meaning of adaptive is clearly
context specific. Negating the axiomatic approach to defining rationality does not
imply relativism, however. Indeed, examples of non-axiomatic theories of decision
making abound. The challenge is to identify observable features of environments
that predict when simplicity will succeed.
Expected-payoff Maximization
Once the environment is specified, making p explicit, the question of determining
how well different decision rules perform is far from obvious. Because there is
random chance in the environment, every choice of an action gives rise to a
probability distribution of payoffs. Choosing the action rule with the highest
associated expected payoff is perhaps the most common benchmark, but many other
statistics of the payoff distribution other than the mean may be important. Linear
regression and Bayesian prediction algorithms are commonly used benchmarks in
simulation studies that seek to gauge the performance of simple heuristics using
real-world data (Czerlinski et al. 1999; Martignon and Schmitt 1999; Martignon and
Hoffrage 2002). Those benchmarks provide useful tools for measuring the
predictive value of information, for example, the predictive gains of moving from
a decision rule based on a single cue to one that utilizes ten pieces of information.
In the abstract environment of the economic model, the unconstrained expected-
payoff maximizing decision rule, assuming it exists and is unique, searches over
every possible rule for mapping K pieces of observable information, X, into actions.
The expected payoff maximizer of E[p(Y, X, a)|X] with respect to a is, in general, a
function of all K cues and is denoted a*(X).
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Defining Frugality
Suppose the decision maker faces no cognitive constraints, no information costs,
and has a complete understanding of the data generating process (i.e., the joint
frequency distribution of Y and X) that determines future outcomes. Under what
conditions on ffY jXðY; X; aÞ;pðY; X; aÞg is the link between the elements of X and
a*(X) broken, despite the dependence of E[Y|X] on all elements of X?
The decision rule a(X) exhibits one basic form of frugality whenever it depends
only on a strict subset of the K elements in X. In other words, there are K predictors
of payoff-relevant outcomes, but the expected-payoff-maximizing algorithm
depends on a strict subset of them. There are other simple rules in the literature,
such as Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (1996) lexicographic take-the-best strategy, that
depend on a strict subset of the cues most of the time, but occasionally look up all K
cues. To deal with such cases, frugality can be defined as a statistic of the stochastic
number of cues used in the decision procedure. For example, sometimes the
algorithm requires all 10 pieces of information, sometimes only 1, but on average, it
looks up 3 cues. An obvious frugality measure, then, is 1 minus the average fraction
of K cues used. By this measure, frugality ranges over the unit interval, with
maximally frugal decision rules, which never look up any cues at all, indicated by a
frugality measure of 1. A decision rule with positive frugality is referred to as frugal.
Of course, there are many frugal decision rules, most of which are maladaptive. The
important question is whether one can identify specially structured environments in
which the maximally adaptive rule a*(X) is guaranteed to be frugal according to the
definition above.
A caveat is in order. Frugal decision rules are not necessarily heuristics, in the
sense of Gigerenzer and Todd (1999). Heuristics are frugal, but the converse does
not hold. The economic, or top-down, approach advanced in this paper is well suited
for identifying conditions under which adaptive decision procedures have low
information requirements. It stops short, however, of discovering new heuristics. To
move from the set of frugal, adaptive decision rules to its strict subset comprised of
heuristics would require additional specificity with regard to the mechanisms of the
human mind. Additional psychological theory and empirical evidence are required.
Still, valid generalizations derived from economic models linking environmental
structure to frugal and adaptive decision rules must apply to heuristics as well, and
therein lies the opportunity for the economic approach to provide insight.
Understanding when reduction of dimensionality is possible—that is, learning to
recognize compressed environments—is itself of tremendous value, as statisticians
(Hansen and Bin 1996) and, increasingly, economists (Zellner et al. 2001) have
shown.
Compressed Environments
The environment eh is said to be compressed whenever its expected-payoff-
maximizing decision algorithm is frugal. In such cases, a strict subset of the relevant
information permits optimal performance and, in this sense, its stochastic payoff
structure is compressed.
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Next, we present a model of a one-cue environment in which the condition
guaranteeing compression (i.e., that a*(X) ignores X) can be stated explicitly.
Compression is equivalent to rational ignoring. Its source is the interaction of
payoffs and probabilities in the external environment that allow optimal action to
get by with reduced informational requirements. The advantage of the economic
approach is that the precise interaction of probabilities and payoffs that leads to
compression can be seen directly in algebraic form, and its sensitivity to various
parameters of interest may be easily examined.
An Example: Theft Deterrence in a Small-scale Society
Consider a small-scale society with boat-making technology and a high degree of
dependence on boats and boat operators for survival. The decision problem is to
choose the quantity of resources to be allocated to theft deterrence, which includes
any activity that reduces the chances of the boat being stolen. Time and material
resources allocated to theft deterrence are aggregated into the scalar action variable
a, ranging from zero to the maximum effort 1, (i.e., 0 \ a \ 1). Theft deterrence
includes such activities as nighttime patrolling, camouflaging, and physically
securing the boat with anchors and ropes, which incurs non-negligible and
increasing marginal cost with each increase in effort, a.
States of nature encode possession or loss of the boat. Theft is coded as the event
Y = 0 (i.e., absence of the boat), and no-theft is coded as Y = 1 (i.e., possession
of the boat). There is just one observable cue X, which correlates positively with Y
and therefore helps predict boat theft. The cue takes on values of 0 and 1 depending
on whether the group was attacked in the preceding week, coding the missing or
present state of group members lost in the attack:
X ¼ 0 if group members are missing, killed in attacks by rival groups;
1 if all group members present.

ð1Þ
Loss of group members tends to coincide with boat theft because the two kinds of
losses share a common cause, which is the presence of hostile competitors in the
vicinity. Thus, the worst and best joint outcomes, theft and attack (0,0) and no-theft
and no-attack (1,1), are more likely than joint outcomes with intermediate payoffs,
theft and no-attack (0,1) and no-theft and attack (1,0).
The motivation for groups to allocate effort to theft deterrence is that higher
choices of a reduce the probability of theft, captured by conditional probabilities of
theft that are decreasing in deterrence effort with the following functional forms:
PrðY ¼ 0 ðtheftÞ j X ¼ 0 ðattackÞÞ ¼ f00ð1  aÞ; ð2Þ
PrðY ¼ 0 ðtheftÞ j X ¼ 1 ðno attackÞÞ ¼ f01ð1  aÞ: ð3Þ
Given that group members were killed and zero deterrence is applied (a = 0), Eq. 2
indicates that the conditional chance of theft is f00. As more resources are spent on
deterrence, the chance of theft conditional on group members having been killed is
reduced, shrinking to zero in case maximum effort is applied (a = 1). Similarly,
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Eq. 3 states that, conditional on no recent loss of group members due to hostilities,
the chance of theft is f01 for zero deterrence, decreasing to zero in case maximum
deterrence is applied. The assumption f00 [ f01 captures the idea that, for any choice
of a, the probability of theft is greater if group members have been attacked than if
no attack occurred.
The opportunity cost of resources allocated to a is assumed to be an increasing,
convex quadratic function, reflecting the idea that doubling the level of deterrence
more than doubles its cost. The payoff function is therefore specified as:
pðY ; X; aÞ ¼ pYX  ca2=2; Y ; X ¼ 0; 1: ð4Þ
The four constants pYX shift payoffs up and down across the four joint state-cue
combinations (Y, X), and the cost parameter c scales the quadratic costliness of
action a.
We assume the group is always better off in possession of the boat (Y = 1 vs.
Y = 0) whether group members have been killed or not (X = 0 or 1):
p11 [ p01 and p10 [ p00: ð5Þ
Similarly, we assume that the group is always better off with more of its members
alive (X = 1 vs. X = 0) whether its boat is stolen or not (Y = 0 or 1):
p11 [ p10 and p01 [ p00: ð6Þ
By assumption, the boat can be operated more efficiently with a full set of boat
operators. Therefore, because the boat operates less efficiently with fewer operators,
the value of the boat is greater when all group members are alive than when some
are killed:
p11  p01 [ p10  p00: ð7Þ
The universe of theft-deterrence environments is parameterized by seven values,
stacked into vector form as h = [p11, p01, p10, p00, f01, f00, c]. The two conditional
probabilities must lie within the unit interval and respect the inequality f00 [ f01.
Payoffs must satisfy inequalities Eq. 5 through Eq. 7. The cost scaling factor c must
satisfy c C max{f00(p10 - p00), (1 - f01)(p11 - p01)} to guarantee existence of an
interior maximizer with respect to a. The boundaries of these restrictions on h define
a dense subset of 7-dimensional Euclidean space in which each point corresponds to
an admissible value of h and, thus, to one particular realization of the theft-
deterrence environment.
The expected payoff function is:
E½pðY; X; aÞjX ¼ ð1  f00Þp10 þ f00p00 þ af00ðp10  p00Þ  ca
2=2 if X ¼ 0;
ð1  f01Þp11 þ f01p01 þ af01ðp11  p01Þ  ca2=2 if X ¼ 1:

ð8Þ
Without further restrictions, it is clear from the piecewise definition of the
expected payoff function that, depending on whether X = 0 or 1, different actions
will be required to maximize expected payoffs. Indeed, the expected payoff
maximizing action rule is itself a piecewise-defined function that provides different
levels of optimal effort depending on the observed value of X:
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aðXÞ ¼ f00ðp10  p00Þ=c if X ¼ 0;
f01ðp11  p01Þ=c if X ¼ 1:

ð9Þ
There is a condition on h, however, under which cancellation of payoffs and
probabilities occurs, and a*(X) is consequently independent of X. Thus, the theft-
deterrence environment h is compressed if:
p10  p00
p11  p01 ¼
f01
f00
: ð10Þ
Any theft-deterrence environment satisfying Eq. 10 gives rise to a payoff-
maximizing effort rule that optimally ignores X. Action functions in compressed
environments choose levels of theft deterrence without regard to observed hostile
attacks, even though hostile attacks correlate with and are indeed causally linked to
boat theft. The intuitive explanation for this is that, conditional on loss of group
members, the decrease in the value of the boat given by the ratio p10p00p11p01 is exactly
offset by an increase in the conditional risk of theft given by f00f01 . In compressed
environments, the two ratios measuring decrease in the boat’s value on one hand,
and increase in the risk of theft on the other, are reciprocals. Thus, compressed
environments are characterized by inverse movement of payoffs and probabilities
across cue observations, X = 1 versus X = 0. Inversely moving payoffs and
probabilities produce a flat expected payoff function even though frequencies and
payoffs are, themselves, nonconstant with respect to X.
Visualizing Cancellation in the Space of Environments
A single realization of the theft-deterrence model requires seven parameter values
for the elements in the vector h, too many to visualize easily. This section introduces
a simplified re-parameterization of payoffs and probabilities in terms of ratios that
reflect values conditional on attack X = 0 versus no-attack X = 1. The simplified
re-parameterization facilitates an intuitive visualization of the model, within which
the set of compressed environments can easily be seen.
First, the re-parameterization. The value of the boat given no-attack, X = 1, is p11
- p01. Similarly, the value of the boat given an attack is p10 - p00. We define the
ratio of the boat’s value conditional on attack to its value conditional on no attack as
g  p10  p00
p11  p01 : ð11Þ
If the boat requires a larger number of people to operate than is available after the
attack, then the boat loses value following the attack, and g will be\1, with a minimum
of zero in the event that the boat loses all value. If, on the other hand, the boat gains
value because of the attack, for example, if the boat provides an essential means of
escaping further attack, then g is larger than one, with no upper bound. The inequality
on payoffs introduced earlier (Eq. 7) translates into g ranging between 0 and 1.
In the parameterization of the previous section, the joint distribution of theft and
attack was determined, already in abbreviated form, by two conditional probability
parameters, Pr(theft | attack) = f00 and Pr(theft | no attack) = f01. Here, we
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introduce a single ratio-of-theft-likelihoods parameter l that measures the gross
percentage increase in the likelihood of theft, conditional on attack:
l  f00=f01: ð12Þ
As long as theft and attack are positively correlated, the restriction f00 [ f01 holds,
which translates as l [ 1.
Given the parameters g and l (g capturing changes in payoffs across states of X,
and l capturing changes in theft probabilities), we can express a similar ratio of
expected-payoff-maximizing actions, that is, optimal effort conditional on X = 0
over optimal effort conditional on X = 1:
að0Þ=að1Þ ¼ gl: ð13Þ
Any set of environments along which the product gl is constant is referred to as a
iso-action-ratio curve. Iso-action-ratio curves are subsets of the universe of
environments along which the ratio of optimal effort following attack versus no
attack is the same. For example, the iso-action-ratio curve given by gl = 1.2
indicates all environments where the optimal reaction to a change in signal X, from
1 to 0, is to increase effort by 20%. There is one special iso-action-ratio curve
defined by the restriction gl = 1 that exactly defines the set of compressed
environments. Everywhere this restriction holds, optimal action is the same
regardless of which attack signal is observed.
Figure 2 depicts the valid parameter space for the theft-deterrence model
projected into (g, l) space. The inequalities on payoffs in previous sections give rise
to two vertical lines at g = 0 and g = 1 that bind g between 0 and 1. The restriction
that g [ 0 follows from the assumption that the boat has positive value. The
restriction that g \ 1 reflects the assumption that the boat’s value decreases
conditional on attack. The horizontal line l = 1 depicts the lower bound on l (i.e.,
l [ 1), which follows from the assumption that X and Y are positively correlated.
Both dimensions of Fig. 2 are ratios of values in which the numerator
corresponds to X = 0 and the denominator corresponds to X = 1, with the ratio
of boat values given by g on the x-axis, and likelihoods of theft given by l on the
y-axis. Figure 2 makes it straightforward to visualize the set of compressed
environments, given by the iso-action-ratio curve gl = 1, along which rational
ignoring occurs. Rational ignoring along the compressed set occurs because
percentage increases in the likelihood of theft, l, are the exact reciprocal of
percentage decreases in the value of the boat, g.
If the modeler wishes to introduce perceptual limits in action space on how finely
levels of effort can be adjusted, a just-noticeable-differences argument augments the
set of ignoring environments from the one-dimensional iso-action-ratio curve
gl = 1 to the dense set in (g, l) space defined as follows. Suppose that, whenever the
optimal action rule prescribes action across attack/no-attack (X = 0/X = 1) states
that are less than s 9 100% different, then the decision maker ignores the signal X
and applies the same action in both states. That is, a s-sensitive decision maker
ignores X and chooses the same level of effort regardless of attack whenever
1  s\að0Þ=að1Þ\1 þ s: ð14Þ
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Given perceptual or technological limitations that make an equivalence class of any
action levels that differ in percentage terms by less than s, the ignoring subset in the
space of environments indexed by (g, l) is enlarged, shown by the shaded area in
Fig. 2.1
There is another large set of compressed environments in which rational ignoring
occurs for a different reason, connected to the cost parameter c, than in the set of
compressed environments depicted in Fig. 1. Recall that the optimal action rule is
given by Eq. 9. An earlier section gave a lower bound on c to insure that a*(X) takes
on admissible values between 0 and 1. If, however:
c\ minff00ðp10  p00Þ; f01ðp11  p01Þg; ð15Þ
(g)
g =  [boat value | attack]/[boat value | no attack] 
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Fig. 2 Compressed environments within the space of al boat-theft deterrence environments. *The action
ratio is defined as a*(0)/a*(1), the expected-payoff-maximizing action (i.e., optimal level of effort)
conditional on the signal X = 0 divided by the expected-payoff-maximizing action conditional on X = 1.
An iso-action-ratio curve is a set within parameter space along which the action ratio is constant. For
example, the set of environments for which a*(0)/a*(1) = 1.2 is an iso-action-ratio curve indicating all
parameterizations for which a change in the signal X, from 1 to 0, leads to a 20 percent increase in action.
**Points to the left of the vertical line g = 0 are inadmissible because of the assumption that the boat has
positive value, g [ 0. ***Points below the horizontal l = 1 are ruled out by the assumption that theft is
positively correlated with attack. ****The restriction that g \ 1 corresponds to the assumption that the
boat’s value is reduced in the event of attack. The model easily allows for extension of parameter space
by admitting points g[1. However, based on the previous assumption that l[1, there are no compressed
environments in the extended region to the right
1 An important theme in the just-noticeable-differences literature is asymmetry of perceptual sensitivity
with respect to deviations from the status quo. Allowing for asymmetric ss would add an additional
degree of psychological plausibility without changing the main conclusion, namely, that the set of
environments in which ignoring is rational is nonempty.
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then the cost parameter is so small that the optimal action is maximum effort,
regardless of the signal X. In this case X is correlated with payoffs, yet the optimal
action algorithm ignores it, but not because of inversely moving payoffs and
probabilities (i.e., g and l are not necessarily reciprocals). Rather, compression
occurs in this case because action is so cheap that the maximum effort is applied
regardless of varying signals about risk. This is analogous to wearing a seat belt
every time one drives, ignoring time-varying signals about risks of an auto
accident.
Conclusion
This paper makes no categorical claim about benefits of ignoring information.
Ignoring is, without doubt, detrimental to the wellbeing of decision makers and
the societies they belong to in some cases. However, the model in this paper does
show clearly that ignoring is not always detrimental. In the theft-deterrence
model, expected payoff maximizing decision rules ignore information that
objectively helps predict future states and payoffs when payoff and probabilistic
information is compressed in the proper way. The compression condition does not
require anything pathological or degenerate about the stochastic payoff process.
Rather, it depends on cancellation of probabilities and payoffs that de-links
variables, which predict both probabilities and payoffs, from expected-payoff-
maximizing action.
Two frequently cited experiments in which predictive information is ignored are
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) engineer-lawyer problem and Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1982) taxi cab problem. In both studies, respondents were asked to
produce posterior probabilities given experimenter-controlled prior probabilities, hit
rates, and false-positive rates. The studies showed a surprising lack of sensitivity to
changes in base rates, which came to be known as base-rate neglect, or the base-rate
fallacy. To the extent that experimental subjects receive higher intrinsic payoffs
from correct inference when the probability of success is low (i.e., take greater
psychological satisfaction in solving more difficult problems), base-rate neglect
could be consistent with expected-payoff maximization. It may be worthwhile
therefore to vary monetary payoffs by difficulty, measure the economic losses
associated with base-rate neglect, if any, and collect post-experiment survey data to
investigate the possibility of asymmetric subjective payoffs in experimental
conditions that otherwise appear symmetric.
Another interesting case close to those working in the scientific community
concerns payoffs from scientific discoveries and their probabilities of occurrence.
Scientific projects with low probabilities of success tend to have large payoffs,
whereas projects that are nearly certain to verify scientists’ hypotheses are
unsurprising and therefore have nearly zero payoff. Perhaps because of cancellation
of probabilities and payoffs, many scientists seem to ignore payoffs and
probabilities, adopting simple heuristics for choosing research agendas, such as
Follow the line of research my advisor works in or Pick projects that are
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intrinsically interesting to me, rather than estimating probabilities of success and
choosing projects according to a maximization algorithm.
The normative implications of ignoring are, in general, ambiguous. This stands in
contrast to decision-theoretic prescriptions advising, in virtually all contexts, that
Bayes rule be followed by conditioning action on the full set of observable
predictors. One of the main implications of the demonstrated existence of
compressed environments in which rational ignoring occurs is that ecological
(i.e., environment-specific) rationality, rather than universal rationality axioms
focused on informational efficiency and internal consistency, are needed to properly
evaluate individual and aggregate consequences of ignoring information. Less
information does not necessarily imply reduced performance.
Using economic models to identify conditions under which informationally
frugal action performs just as well as information-greedy optimization is analogous
to simulation studies which find that simple decision rules can match (or exceed in
out-of-sample prediction) the performance of prediction rules based on regression or
Bayesian networks. Bullock and Todd (1999) investigated a similar set of questions
using agent-based modeling and computer simulation. As one might anticipate,
distinct methods lead to distinct and sometimes difficult to compare results. The
simulation approach requires specific distributional assumptions and functional
forms, or else relies on particular databases of real-world data sets that are, at some
stage of analysis, interpreted as statistically representative of a larger population of
environments.
The economic approach, on the other hand, searches a much larger space of
possible environments, although still within the confines of a parameterized
mathematical model. To the extent that only a small subset of real-world
environments correspond to the abstract environments in economic models, it is
not clear whether the generality of such abstract models is a virtue. Valid
generalizations for the set of all real-world environments may not hold more
generally within the larger set of fictitious environments parameterized in the
economic model, and would therefore be impossible to discover in an unrestricted
model space. These potential disadvantages are counterbalanced by one clear
benefit of formal modeling, which is the opportunity to observe and interpret
functional links between environments and the relative success of different decision
procedures. In spite of methodological differences, both simulation and formal
modeling converge around the proposition of ecological rationality as an organizing
framework for normative decision theory and its application.
Finally, we note that the model of adaptive ignoring without cognitive limitations
presented in this paper is both distinct from, and complementary to, bounded
rationality explanations for behavioral insensitivity to relevant information. The
focus of this investigation was squarely on the role of the external environment in
favoring different amounts of usage of available information. Joint explanations
concerning the match between external stochastic payoff structure and internal
cognitive processes provide perhaps the most promising direction to account for the
demonstrated real-world success of simple decision algorithms.
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